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SUMMARY ARGUMENT
As this court will learn by Third District Judge Randall N. Skanchy's review and
findings of the Appellant's State Habeas Petition of December 9, 2009 that: "the Court
finds that the claims are not frivolous on their fact." However, instead of ordering an
evidentiary hearing on such type of meritorious claims of the Appellant's State Petition,
he arbitrarily granted the State's Motion For Summary Judgement. Thus, because of the
above arbitrary summary dismissal of the Appellant's State Petition, the Appellant now
hereby respectfully demands in this appeal of 2011, that the Utah Supreme Court reexamine not only the entire case and unlawful 1983 conviction of a capital first degree
murder, but also his 2005 indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility
of parole and original 1983 state conviction on capital murder be reversed in its entirety
and that he either be granted a new trial on the grounds that his death penalty sentence
was erroneously reversed on three prongs Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
violations in his 1983 jury trial which this court merely had his 1983 unlawful death
penalty sentence reduced. Which in reality, under each of the three Brady violations
which were all found to exist in the Appellant, Tillman's 1983 death penalty trial and case
this State Supreme Court should order that the Appellant either be given: (1) a complete
new trial; (2) that his death sentence of 1983 be reduced to either a second degree murder
conviction or manslaughter. See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, Id. at 590-91 (Utah
1987), dissenting rulings of Justice Durham and Justice Zimmerman; or (3) that the
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Appellant be released from prison on the grounds of being unlawfully confined on an
unlawful "defective information" death sentence for over 28 years, that which was
obtained by the State through illegal methods, particularly in violating Appellant, federal
and state constitutional rights under the United States Supreme Court prongs, standards
and tests of Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S.
373, U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150 (1972), United States v. Agurs.
427 U.S. at 112 (1976), United States v. Baglev. 473 U.S. 473 U.S. 667 at 676 (1985).
Where according to each of these U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, they require that the
Appellant, ElRoy Tillman, be given a "new trial" instead of the State merely reducing his
1983 "death sentence" reduced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 2005.
As shown to have occurred in the instant case before this appellate court today. In
comparing Bank v. Dretke. 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 1251 (2004). After the accused failed
to obtain relief in direct appeal and in two state post conviction proceedings, the accused,
in a third state post conviction proceeding, included Brady claims concerning two key
witnesses. (1) This claim was that the prosecution - in asserted violation of due process
clauses of the federal constitution Fourteenth Amendment as construed in Brady v.
Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1994 (1963) - - had concealed from jury credibility
impeachment evidence, in the form of a pre-trial incomplete transcripts and tape
recording would revealing that the chief witness trial testimony had been intensively
coached by prosecutor's and law-enforcement officers. Thus, prosecutions explained to
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the jury the "missing secret recording and incomplete pre-trial transcripts of its OWN
State Chief Witness, of which he made himself in secret." Through Tillman's direct
appeal, and post conviction's state prosecutors Mr. Christensen continued to hold secret
pre-trial transcripts and tape recording links his star chief witness Ms. Sager to Sgt. Ken
Thirst. Tillman alleged as well that during the guilt phase of his trial, the state
deliberately withheld information "Critical to the Jury's Assessment of the Actions and
Credibility" including the prosecutors lying about the secret tape recording in which he
made that - - came up missing. Tillman as Afro-American, request in the interest of
justice, fairness and equal protection of the law clauses, of this miscarriage of justice . . .
Grounds for post-conviction relief in Utah include circustance in which "the conviction
was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution
or the Utah Constitute." Utah Code Ann. 78-35-a-104(l)(A)( 1996). The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitute and Article I Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution accord due process rights to an accused. These rights are violated when the
state withholds material favorable mitigate evidence from defense counsel at trial.
Moreover, the defective information failure to charge "essential elements" of the offense
constitutes a jurisdictional defect. United States v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218 at 221 (5th Cir.
1996); Russell v. United States. 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962). See, Exhibits (A-B-C-D &
F).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Appellant's appeal now filed before this court today his case must be re-viewed
by the court on the grounds that the third district court Judge Randall N. Skanchy's Dec 9,
2010, findings, conclusions and final order denying Appellant's State Habeas Petition is
in error in erroneously claiming that "all of Tillman's claims are timed barred."
Particularly, on Appellant's claim on (1) being unlawfully charged, tried and convicted on
a defective information, and when in fact this particular claims is not time barred as it is a
type of Plain Error Claims on Attacking a trial court Jurisdiction on being denied a fair
trial state defective information and on the Appellant's Tillman's, trial counsel's failure to
object to such as type of a defective charging document. Thus, the Appellant's here
requests that this court review his entired case under Utah's Standard of Review for
Correctness. "Compare Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962); see e.g., U.S. v.
Glick, 142 F3.d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1998) (defendant may challenge court's failure to
charge with a crime because this is a jurisdictional defect that maybe raised on appeal
despite defendant's failure to preserve the issue for appeal): see, e.g., U.S. v. Forbes, 16
F.3d 1294, 1297 (1 st Cir. 1994) (Objection that indictment failed to charge essential
elements of reentry following deportation offense properly raised for first time on
appeal); U.S. v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Gatewood, 173 F.3d
983, 986 (6th Cir. 1999); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

The following are all cases related including prior appeals. State v.
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Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (1987); Tillman v. Cook, 885 P.2d 211 (1993);
Tillman v. Cook. 510 U.S. 1050 (1994); Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116
(10th Cir. 2000); Tillman v. Cook.

U.S.

, 121 S.Ct. 664 (2000);

Tillman v. State. 128 P.3d 1123 (2005).
2.

Statement of facts.
The Appellant was convicted of the following crimes: in 1983, was

convicted for a capital crime of criminal homicide, first degree murder. In 2005, the
result of a Brady v. Maryland, violation, it was set aside in the case of Tillman v. State.
128 P.3d 1123 (Utah 2005). The Appellant received the following specific sentence: life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
On Dec. 9, 2010. Did the Third District Court trial judge
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy, in reviewing the Appellant's postconviction state petition ERR in its final finding, conclusion,
and order denying Appellant, Tillman's, State Habeas Petition
without first granting the Appellant's motion for a State
Evidentiary Hearing and Request for Appointment of
Counsel?
ISSUE 1: The Appellant answers "yes" to the above question on the grounds that the
Third District Court Trial Judge, Hon. Skanchy's, errored in denying the Appellant's two
motions for a State Evidentiary Hearing and Request for Appointment of Counsel,
particularly, on the Appellant's claims that no Utah State Trial or Appellate Court has
ever Squarely or Directly addressed his 1988 claims of being improperly unlawfully
charged, tried, convicted, and then given an "unlawful death sentence" in 1983, that
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which was based on the State's "defective information" that failed to properly charge the
Appellant with a "Capital Murder Offense." See exhibits (A; B; C; and D).
In addition, the Appellant also claims in this appeal of the third district trial Judge
Hon. Skanchy was in error in falsely claiming that "All of the Appellant, Tillman's claims
of being denied a fair and just trial were all "time barred," particularly, when in view of
the fact that Appellant's 1988 claims on unlawfully being tried, convicted, and then given
an "unlawful death penalty sentence" that which was based on the State's defective
information, "were not time barred" (and can be raised at any time) as these types of
claims are claims that which are attacking the trial court's lack ofjurisdiction and
authority to try the Appellant with the "Essential Elements" of the crime of first degree
Capital Murder to this day! Thus, it is a jurisdiction claim (question) of Utah's Trial
Court not having legal jurisdiction to try the Appellant for a "Capital Crime." Compare
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e), nonetheless if anything, the Appellant
asserts that the third district court trial Judge, Hon. Skanchy should of granted the
Appellant a full and fair state Evidentiary Hearing on his claims of being unlawfully tried
and convicted on the State Prosecutor, Michael Christensen's defective information. In
fact, as all of the Appellant's trial and Appellate Court pleadings clearly show for over 29
full years now, his claims on being erroneously charged for a "Capital Crime" has never
been Squarely or Directly addressed by any trial or Appellate Court in the State of Utah.
In fact, as the court records all clearly show, all that can be said before this Utah Supreme
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Court is that Utah's trial and Appellate Court's have each merely addressed this particular
type of claim, in simply ruling that the State of Utah had properly charged the Appellant
by way of Utah's MERGER DOCTRINE in lawfully trying the Appellant on his 1982
Capital Crime of first degree murder.
Thus, after serving over 29 full years of "Illegal Confinement" the Appellant again
continues to raise his "None Time Barred" plain error claims being unlawfully confined,
or, imprisoned on the State Prosecutor's 1982 Defective Information in not properly
charging the Appellant for a "Capital Murder" crime in the first degree, even as found in
the split Utah Supreme Court Opinions of now Chief Justice Durham ans Ex-Chief
Justice Zimmerman, that the Appellant, EIRoy Tillman's, case warrants a complete
reversal of his 1983 conviction for first degree Murder; and further that the 1983 State
Conviction and Prison Sentence should be reduced from being a capital crime to a
manslaughter. Compare Cone v. Bell 129 S.Ct. 1759 (2009) (Holdings that failing to
address raised issues or claims are error). Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
(2000) id. At 43 (every offense consists of certain acts done or omitted under certain
circumstances; and in an information for the offense, it is not sufficient to charge the
defendant generally with have committed it,. . . but all facts and circumstances
constituting the offense must be specially set forth"); id. at 180 ("Every Offense Consists
of Certain Acts done or Omitted, under Certain Circumstances, all of which must be
stated in the information . . . and be proved as laid"). Comparing U.S. v. Cobrera-Teran,
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168F.3dl41, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. DuBo, 186 F.3d 1117, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999),
'court held: if properly challenged prior to trial, an information complete failure to
"Recite an Essential Element of the Charged Offense" is not a minor or technical flaw
subject to harmless error analysis but a fatal flaw requiring dismissal of the information.
Compare State v. Topham, 123 P.888, 41 Utah 39 (1912); People v. Hill 3 P.75, 3 Utah
334 (Utah 1984); Comparing Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1962). The Utah
Supreme Court stated: "that the availability of a bill of particulars will "not cure an
indictment that omits an "Essential Element" of the offense." See: Exhibits A-B-C-D-F.
Appellant Asserts That This Case Meets The Three
Prong BRADY Violation Standard and Tests

Issue 2: Appellant now asserts that not only that his entire criminal case was prejudiced
because of the state prosecutor's knowingly and intentional suppression of mitigating
evidence in his case, in direct violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
Gigliov. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Napur v. Illinois. 360 U.S.264, at 271 (1959);
U.S. v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Pre-Trial Rights.
In addition, in the State Summary Judgement Motion, filed April 20, 2010, id. At
10. The State argued that the Appellant, EIRoy Tillman, never proved that he could not
have discovered it in time to raise his claim in his first - post conviction action. Tillman,
2005 Ut. 56, 17-18. The state stands by the argument, "although the Supreme Court did
not resolve that issue." On the three prong Brady v. Maryland, violation of (1) Pre-Trial
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suppression of Mitigating Evidence, including pre-transcripts incomplete. (2) The use of
perjured testimony; and there the withholding impeachment evidence. And since the
State attorney, Thomas A. Brunker, admits to the third district court, in his above-stated
Argument requesting Summary Judgement of the Appellant's Case, of April 10, 2010,
that this State Supreme Court has never resolved the BRADY violation issues involving
the Appellant's appeal before this court today. Then in accordance to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, Supra, (1963) in Napur v. Illinois, Supra, (1959);
and in Giglio v. U.S., Supra (1972). Including in the U.S. v. Baglev, Supra, (1985)
decision, this Utah Supreme Court is required to abide by the holdings of these U.S.
Supreme Court decisions when applying them to the Appellant, Tillman's, case on appeal
today by ordering that Appellant's case warrants either (1) a complete reversal of his 1983
conviction of capital first degree murder. (2) A new trial, (3) or a prison sentence
reduction from life with the possibility of parole, or in the alternative to a conviction of
manslaughter.
Issue 3: Appellant further asserts in this appeal that Utah's State Prosecutor, a Mr.
Michael Christensen, had knowingly and intentionally violated Appellants federal and
state constitutional rights to effective assistance of his 1983 trial attorneys, where he and
his state prosecution team "Inferred with the ability of Appellant trial counsel's ability to
make independent pre-trial and actual trial decisions on how to prepare and thus conduct
the Appellant, EIRoy Tillman's, pre and actual trial defenses to not having committing
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"An Aggravated Capital Murder Offense." For example, such as knowingly and
intentionally suppression (mitigating) evidence during the Appellant's 1983 trial, and
where as also shown in the third district court's ruling in Tillman v. State, 128P.3d 1123
id at 3, 9 (Utah 2005), "where if found that the state prosecutor, Michael Christensen, did
in fact, knew that: A tape recording of Sgt. Ken Thirst's polygraph testing interview with
the State's chief prosecution witness, Ms. Sager's was in 'Existence' at the time. But
when at trial, the State introduced testimony that "NO RECORDING" of the interview of
Ms. Sager's, was ever made! See; Tillman v. State, Supra, id at 3, 9. Such is the true
nature of the State using perjured testimony to convict the Appellant of Capital first
degree murder. Therefore, as indicated above, the State prosecutor, Michael
Christensen's failure to be honest, failure to disclose the State's "Suppressed Pre-Trial
Transcripts and Tape Recording to his Trial Attorneys!" Also had the effect of denying
The Appellant's Tillman his state and federal constitutional rights to ineffective
assistance of counsel particularly in the State's allowing the Sgt. Ken Thirst to knowingly
commit perjury in his trial testimony that his conversations with the State's chief witness,
Ms. Sagers, were not recorded, including where the state prosecutor Christensen, himself
in 1983, also committed perjury in falsely stating on record that he was unaware that a
recording or transcripts of the interview with Ms. Sagers, had ever been made and
because of it, in turn, gave both the Appellant's trial judge, jury's the fact finder, and his
trial attorney's all the false impression and belief that there were no undisclosed pre-trial
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recordings and transcripts of police interviews of the State's chief witness, Ms. Sagers!
When in fact Utah's Supreme Court knows particularly from it own split court ruling in
the Appellant, Tillman, case over the last 23 years. That in State v. Tillman, 750 P.d 543,
id at 583-91 (Utah 1987). The chief prosecutor, Michael Christensen's did in fact know
who was doing the "State Secret Suppressed Tape Recording, and Pre-Trial Transcripts of
the Police Interviews with Ms. Sagers." The reality is it was himself!!
Thus, the Appellant in his Appeal Brief with this court today clearly shows not
only how the State had used "Perjured Testimony" of the police Sgt. Ken Thirst, and of
the prosecutor, Michael Christensen, to obtain a conviction of capital first degree murder
of the Appellant, but as well knowingly and intentionally committing "Plain Error" in
denying the Appellant's trial attorneys from being able to provide him with effective
assistance of counsel, as well as a fair and just trial. Compare Napur v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959); Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that support the
Appellant's claims that his conviction of 1983, must be either reversed or that he be
granted a new trial as mandated in the above cited U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
including Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963); U.S. v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667,673
(1985); citing of Napur v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of thee
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factor as the possible interest of the witness
testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend"). See Brown v.
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Wainwright 785 F.2 1457, 1464 (11th Cir. 1986) (Government has duty not to present
false evidence, citing Giglio, Supra, id at 150 (1972); and with Brady, Supra, id at 83
(1963). Where Justice Harlan conceds that the State may not knowingly use perjured
testimony or allow it to remain uncorrected, as had occurred in Appellant's case on
convicting him on evidence that is false; and as well non-existent in the Appellant ElRoy
Tillman's 1983 trial record, including at the Appellant's 2000 state Evidentiary Hearing
before the Honorable Third District Court former Judge Lewis.
It took Appellant Tillman, 23 years to uncover prosecution
misconduct of perjury and pre-trial suppression of mitigating
evidence and other types of plain error to learn that this case
is one of a complete miscarriage of justice, especially in
denying him a just and fair trial that which was based on a
wrongful criminal capital charge of capital murder
Issue 4: Throughout the last 23 years, Appellant, Elroy Tillman's court appointed
counsel's not only denied him effective assistance of counsel, such as during his "2005"
re-sentencing hearing in failing to object to the State's defective Information of 1983, but
as well, in also not demanding that the Appellant be granted a new trial on the grounds
that the State prosecutor failed to provide to the defense "Mitigating Evidence" from his
jury trial and Appellant court appointed attorneys. The injustice of being denied a
constitutional right to a fair trial, is when State's prosecutor "lied," particularly, as shown
in the Appellant case, where the State prosecutor, Michael Christensen, stood before the
trial court, and his Empanelled Jury:

Stating: "there was 'no' tape recording made

of its own star witness when he knew it was "un-true." See; Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d
13
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1123, id at 3, 9, (2005). State v. Hales. 2007 Ut 14, 152 P.3d 321; State v. Martin, 44
P.3d 805, 2002 Ut 34; State v. Rammasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407-08 (Utah 1989) (finding
reversible error in a bench trial where the case hinged on the victim's testimony and the
inadmissible evidence unfairly bolstered the victim's (credibility); Mitchell 779 P.2d is at
1121-22 (finding prejudice where hypnotically-influenced testimony was used to bolster
the state theory); State v. Sibert 310 P.2d 388, 390, 392-93 (Utah 1957). In effect, in
1983, as shown over the last 29 years Appellant's trial and Appellant Attorneys have
knowingly and intentionally allowed the Appellant's "case to sink into a type of legal
entanglement, "to where no Utah court has ever Squarely or Directly addressed
Appellant's 1983 claims of being improperly charged unlawfully tried, convicted and
sentenced to a "death sentence" on not only the States "defective information." See
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993) Stewart, Justice (dissenting): is at 229, in
addition, the damage from the fire was minor. There is no evidence that the damage
exceed $5,000, the amount of damage a fire must cause to be a felony under the arson
statute in effect at the time of the crime. Utah Code Ann. 76-6-102(2X1978). See
Exhibit (E). Thus, the setting of the fire may only have constituted a misdemeanor. I
cannot conclude that the legislature intend a misdemeanor to constitute an aggravating
circumstance of capital homicide under Utah Code Ann. 76-5-202 (l)(d). See Exhibit (C).
To so conclude would create a grave question as to the constitutionality of arson as an
aggravating circumstance in a case such as this. Moreover, on the state Utah's Appellate
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Court's 2005 still un-resolved issue of the Brady violation claims. Such as on whether or
not Appellant, EIRoy Tillman, should have been granted a new trial instead of simply
setting his 1983 "death sentence" aside. Compare: Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83.
(1963); Memann v. Richarson. 398 U.S. 759, 771.N14 (1970); Earlev v. Issac. 456 U.S.
107, 133-34 (1982); Cone v. Bell 129 S.Ct. 1769 (2009); Adams v. State. 2005 Ut 62,
123 P.3d 400, 535 Ut. Adv. Rep. 15; Bundv v. DeLand. 763 P.2d 803, 805 (1988); State
v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 50 (1988); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (1990); Dye v.
Halbauer. 546 U.S. 1. 3 (7005).
From prosecution misconducts of perjury and pre-trial suppressions of mitigating
evidence and other types of plain errors to court appointed attorney's and the Utah trial
courts has made a mess of Appellant's case, blaming each other and not squarely or
directly addressing the issues properly and fairly, raised in: Tillman. Supra (Utah 1993)
quoting: Justice, Stewart (dissenting). And issue crucial to the legality of the conviction
and death penalty in this case has not been decided by a majority of the Justices of this
court on either the direct appeal or this appeal, even though it was discussed in the direct
appeal. "On this appeal, the majority does not address the issue, which is whether a
conviction and death penalty can be sustained on a vote of less than a majority of the
Justice of this Court." For the reasons explained below, I would set the death penalty
aside and remand for a new penalty hearing. This issue arises because of the divisions in
the court in the first appeal. A jury convicted EIRoy Tillman of capital homicide and
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imposed the death penally. A divided court affirmed the conviction and the sentence on
appeal in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). Although Chief Justice Hall's lead
opinion stated the position of majority of the Court on most issues, no one opinion stated
the position of majority on all issues. Id at 550-77. Justice Stewart wrote an opinion
concurring in part concurring in the result in part. Id at 577-82. Justice Howe also wrote
a concurring and concurring in the result opinion. Id at 582-83. Justice Durham wrote a
concurring and dissenting opinion, id at 583-91, as did Justice Zimmerman, id. at 591.
Once again, Justice Stewart, dissenting: I submit that a failure of a majority of this court
to address and resolve an issue critical to the legitimacy of a conviction and death penalty
is an "unusual circumstances" and that the majority commits constitutional error by not
doing so. I now address how the issue arose, why the issue was not addressed on direct
appeal, and how I think it should be resolved. Id at 225.
Appellant's further submit's that this case one of a complete miscarriage of justice
that which was based on wrongful criminal capital charge of capital murder.
CONCLUSION
The facts and issues are plain and simple: State's information failure to met a
pleading requirement of state and federal procedure, violating Tillman, due process and
equal protection under the 14th Amendment. See also, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure _
_Rule 4(b), and the same typ of federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 7(c)(1).

Tillman contends, "State information failed to charge any 'Essential Elements' of capital
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murder on the grounds that it did not list any of the statutory element or any meaning of
the offenses felonies crimes (Burglary, Aggravated Burglary, Arson, and Aggravated
Arson) used as aggravators to support the Capital Murder charge. See, Exhibits (A-B-CD-F). Tillman further contends that State's failure to properly charged murder, violated
his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial and jury verdict. See, State v.
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, id at 590-91 (1987); State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1158-59
(1991). See, Exhibit B, F Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Verdict, and Utah Statutes of

Rule 21. (bYd)

76-6-202. Burglary: 76-6-203. Aggravated Burglary:

76-6-102. Arson: 76-6-103. Aggravated Arson. Each felony offense or crimes (used as
aggravators) has its OWN statute cites, punishment, and definition constituting or
meaning of what each elements is in Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, none is
listed in 76-5-202. sub-section (d). Therefore, the issue is, does it no relieve the States of
its burden to charge a proper legal criminal homicide, murder first degree, a capital
offense! See, Russell v. U.S.. 369 U.S. 749-769-70 (1962). As a result of the omission.
"Essential Elements" of the State information charge, the question, "is the States
information charge, defective or not? See, State v. Topham. 123 P.888, 41 Ut. 39 (1912);
U.S. v. DuBo. 186F.3d 1177, 1179-81 (9th Cir. 1999): U.S. v. Cabrerra-Teran. 168F.3d
144.45 (5th c i r -

19 99).

u . s . y. Davis. 184 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 1999) (indictment

charging defendant with violation of "failure to stop" statute insufficient because failed to
allege "great bodily injury element" of offense, thus preventing defendant from preparing
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sufficient defense). U.S. v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1082 (6th Cir 2001) (indictment
charging violation 18 U.S.C. 875 (c) insufficient because indictment omitted 2 of 3
essential elements of claim). See: Exhibits (A-B-C-D-F).
Moreover, as shown throughout the Appellant's Appeal Brief, because of the
State's use of perjured testimony in convicting him of capital first degree murder,
including violating his state and federal constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) in suppressing mitigating evidence by withholding pre-trial transcripts
from the trial judge, his jury as fact finder, and Appellant's trial attorney; in turn not only
denied him his federal and state constitutional rights to receive effective assistance of
counsel but also denied him a fair and just trial. Thus, based on the above stated grounds,
arguments, and cited case laws, the Appellant respectfully requests that this court either
grant him (1) a new trial, (2) reverse his 1983 conviction of capital first degree murder or
(3) simply order Appellant release from his unlawful imprisonment. See, Compare: U.S.
v. Russell 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973), holding that: Courts will dismiss informations for
government misconduct outside the information process on due process grounds when
such conduct is so outrageous that it violates "fundamental fairness" or is "shocking to
the universal sense of justice."
This is the defective information question: The State's information charged the
Appellants Tillman's of committing burglary and arson

, however, "they didn't

inform him nor tell him what burglary and arson were, therefore, how does he knows if he
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committed the crimes of burglary and arson"? See, Utah Rule

4(b), and federal rules __

_ 7 (c)(1) Exhibit -D-. State information failure to meet a pleading requirement of state
and federal procedure; "States information failed, it did not charge any essential elements
of Capital Murder, nor it did not list any of the elements of the offense felonies crimes.
Nor any statutory citing or language of burglary; Aggravated; burglary; Arson;
Aggravated Arson (used as aggravators to support a capital murder. And because of it,
this court today must reverse his 1983 State conviction of Capital 1st degree murder.)

Dated this 2J . day of March, 2011.
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INSTRUCTION NO .

*

*

When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreman, who, as foreman, will preside over
your deliberations*
Your verdict in this case must be either:
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE FIRST
Guilty of
DEGREE, a Capital Offense

as

charqed in the Information; or
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND
Guilty of
DEGREE

: or

Not Guilty;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in writing,
and when found, must be signed and dated by your foreman and then
returned by you to this court. When your verdict has been found,
notify the bailiff that you are ready t^report to the court.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah
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In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
v§.

VERDICT

ELROY TILLMAN,
Case No. CR 82-1081
Defendant
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, having..her-eto£ore-£aund.
..£hfi...d£f£ndan£...guil£y...a£.„Crirai^
A..CapA.taI...01£e.n£e.......fl;^
r e n d e r a v e r d i c t of d e a t h .

Dated

2ZG
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PP0« a eon^cause the

death penalty those defendants who
killed in cold blood in order to advance
an independent felonious purpose, e.g.,
cnarge of homicide. Still other courts
narrowly construed the neriod H
who carried out an execution-style slaywhich the felony was in Z
"g
ing of the victim of or witness to a holdup, a kidnapping, or a rape.
g
he
operation of the rule.
The Legislature's goal is not achieved,
however, when the defendant's intent is
These limitations confine the scope of
not to steal but to kill and the robbery is
the felony-murder rule, but they do not
merely incidental to the murder . . . beresolve its essential illogic.
cause its sole object is to facilitate or
Id. § 210.2, at 34-36 (citations omitted). I
conceal the primary crime
To perconclude that the Model Penal Code lanmit a jury to decide who will live and who
guage was intended to include killings inciwill die on the basis of whether in the
dental to felonies and not felonies incidencourse of committing a first degree murtal to killings.
der the defendant happens to engage in
ancillary
conduct that technically constiThe State concedes in its brief that the \
tutes
robbery
or one of the other listed
Utah death penalty statute is closely analo- <
felonies would be to revive "the risk of
gous to California's, which is also modeled ;
wholly arbitrary and capricious action"
on the Model Penal Code. The California
condemned
by the high court plurality in
statutory language is "while the defendant I
I
Gregg.
We
conclude that regardless of
was engaged in . . . the commission of,"
chronology
such
a crime is not a murder
language that is virtually identical to ;
j
committed
"during
the commission" of a
"while the actor was engaged in the com- j
mission of," the Utah formulation. The jf robbery within the meaning of the statute.
construction given the California statute by
the California Supreme Court is therefore 27 Cal.3d at 61-62, 609 P.2d at 505-06, 164
relevant and helpful. In People v. Green,
Cal.Rptr. at 38-39 (citations omitted). It is
27 CaLSd 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1
logical to assume that the Utah Legislature
(1980), that court, discussing an earlier version of the California language which, al- intended similarly restrictive, rather than
though worded differently, had an identical expansive, import to the phrase "while engaged in the commission of." The use of
meaning, said:
the Model Penal Code language supports
fW]e infer that the purpose of the Legis- such a view, as does the reasoning used by
lature was to comply insofar as possible the California Supreme Court in Greeny
with what it understood to be the manThere is no question on this record t h a t ^
date of Fitrman and Gregg et al. At the the felonies charged were committed t o ^ J^
very least, therefore, the Legislature advance the killing, rather than vice versa, F^ W
must have intended that each special cir- Therefore, what we have in this case is a ts> ^
cumstance provide a rational basis for murder coincidental!)' accomplished by r£ k?
distinguishing between those murderers
means of burglary and arson. Absent
who deserve to be considered for the
some other legitimate aggravating factors
death penalty and those who do not. The
(several of which may have been present
Legislature declared that such a distinchere but were not charged or proved), detion could be drawn, inter alia, when the
defendant committed a "willful, deliber- fendant was improperly convicted of first
^
ate and premeditated" murder "during degree murder, and the conviction should
the commission" of a robbery or other be reduced to a first degree felony.
murder

S

N

listed felony. [Former § 190.2 subd.
(c)(3).] The provision thus expressed a
legislative belief that it was not unconstitutionally arbitrary to expose to the
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e merger
nanimous
istance, I

would vacate defendant's first degree murder convicSbm Because bT"prosecutorTal
misconduct, I would also vacate the death
penalty. Defendant is entitled to a reduction of his conviction to second degree murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1978);
State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah
1985).
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring
I S v and dissenting).
I concur with the majority in parts I, II,
III, IV, V, VI, IX, X, and XI. I dissent
from parts VII and VIII and join Justice
Durham's opinion as it regards the analysis
of the unanimity and merger questions. I
also agree with her that with respect to the
merger issue, the failure of the State to
^
charge and prove legally sufficient aggra^ ^ 3 "vating circumstances requires that the
death penalty be reversed, that the conviction be reduced to second degree murder,
and that the matter be remanded for sentencing.

IssM M

(o

|KEYNUMBLRSYSUM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Juan Dios CANTU, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860052.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 12, 1988.
Defendant was convicted by jury in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Raymond S. Uno, J., of aggravated robbery7, aggravated burglary and aggravated
assault, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) evidence
was sufficient to sustain convictions; (2)
general exception to "parties" instructions
was insufficient to preserve for appellate
750P.2d-14

review objection to giving instruction on
accomplice liability; and (3) defendant suffering from undisclosed mental illness was
not entitled to arrest of judgment.
Remanded with instructions.
Zimmerman, J., filed opinion concurring in result, in which Durham, J., joined.
Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, filed
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which Hall, C.J., joined.

1. Criminal Law <S=>1144.13(2), 1159.2(7)
Upon appeal challenging sufficiency of
evidence to support verdict, Supreme Court
will reverse only when evidence, viewed in
light most favorable to verdict, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that defendant
committed crime of which he was convicted.
2. Assault and Battery e=>92(l)
Burglary <©=>41(1)
Robbery ®=>24.1(2)
Defendant's testimony that he entered
victim's house by prying open window, police's discovery of defendant's jacket
stained with victim's blood in victim's
house, and victim's identification of defendant as her assailant were sufficient to sustain convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-103, 76-6-203, 76-6-302.
3. Robbery <s=>24.1(2)
Evidence that defendant accosted victim with knife and club and demanded to
knowT where victim kept her silver and gold
was sufficient to sustain conviction of aggravated robbery, even though there was
no evidence that anything was taken from
person or immediate presence of victim.
U.C.A.1953, 76-4-101, 76-6-301, 76-6-302.
4. Criminal Law <8=>1059(2)
General exception to "parties" instructions wras insufficient to preserve for appeal alleged error in giving instruction on
accomplice liability. U.C.A.1953, 77-3519(c).
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-35-21 i

opportunity to defend himself. State v.
'Howell (1982) 649 P 2d 91.

that the defendant intended the natural consequences of" his act. State v. Kobichaux
(1981) 639 P 2d 207.
~
Objections to instructions.
Where defendant was charged with theft |
| Except when necessary to avoid manifest by deception, instruction to jury stating thatj'
|injustice, this rule prohibits the assigning as they "may" employ a presumption that 'The j
[error the trial court's failure to give a jury ljiw presumes tnat a person intends "the rea-1
• instruction where no objection is made sonable and ordinary consequences of Kis
| before the jury is instructed; failure of trial own acts" violated defendant's constitutional
court to give an instruction on the inherent right to due process of law because under
I frailties of eyewitness identification did not such instruction the burden of persuasion on
constitute an injustice. State v. Malmrose the element of intent, in the mind of the
jury, may have been shifted to the defendant;
(1982) 649 P 2d 56.
such error was not cured by a further
I Presumption instructions.
instruction that "the evidentiary presumpI Where defendant was charged with theft, tions provided for in other instructions do
jury instruction stating that "the law not relieve the State of its burden to prove
presumes that a person intends the reason^ the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
able and ordinary consequences of his own doubt, and further do not relieve the State of
\ acts" violated defendant's constitutional due its burden to prove each element of the parprocess of law rights because under the ticular offense being considered by you'';
instruction given, the burden of persuasion however, the jury may be instructed that it!
I ofTIhe element of intent, in the jury's mind, "may, on the basis of all the evidence, includ- j
|jnay have been shifted to the defendant; the ing the inference that people usually intend !
'jury should, at most, be instructecPtnat it the natural consequences of their acts, find
may, on the basis of all the evidence, includ-, that the defendant intended the natural coning the inference that people usually intend sequences of his act." State v.'Walton (1982)
the natural consequences of their acts, find 646 P 2d 689.
77-35-20.

Rule 20 — Exceptions unnecessary.

I Failure to object.
i Supreme Court was precluded from reaching on appeal the issue if prosecutor's state-

ments constituted an impermissible comment
upon defendant's right not to testify where
defendant did not object at trial to the statements. State v. Hales (1982) 652 P 2d 1290.

^^^^O^^^BS^ae^M
The verdict of the jury shall be either
"guilty" or "not'guilty/' "not guilty by reason of insanity," "guilty and mentally
ill," or "not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a. lesser included offense,
or "not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill" provided t h a t when the defense of mental illness has been asserted and
the defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was mentally tW insane at the
time of the commission of the offense charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by
reason of mental illness insanity."
j
1*%^
It shall be returned by the jury to the judge •
in open court and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the defendant
voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may be received in his absence.
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at any time during its deliberations may return a verdict or verdicts with respect to any defendant as to whom
it has agreed. If the jury cannot agree with respect to all, the defendant or defenda n t s ^ i to^^ whom it does jiot agree may be tried again.
"^
tt
than one offense, : charged,
^§M^
separately i n S e
yeiciiet.
™-?-T- w "-~
•:*: (e) The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense charged or to any -j
offense necessarily included in the offense charged or an attempt to commit either j
the offense charged or .an offense necessarily included therein.
I J l l ^ F When§a>;ySrdicf
JL Before it-is recorded^the jury shall be polled (
hat ^ ~ iuest o f \ & ;
or'
be polled at thejfflrffs own instance. If^ upon'
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CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

the poll, there is not unanimous concurrence,. thejVur^m,^^
for further deliberations or may be'discharged. If the-;v^gi^
be recorded.
^(g) If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict or the case is dismissed and
the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause, he shall be disrharflftd as
soon as the judgment is given. If a verdict of guilty is returned, .the-*eourt may
order the defendant to be taken into custody to await judgment on the verdict or
may permit the defendant to remain on bail.
History: C. 1953, 77-35-21, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 7.
:

77-35-21.5. Plea claiming mental illness or insanity — Procedure — Verdict
— Sentence — Commitment — Discharge — Probation. (1) Upon a plea of
guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall
hold a hearing within a reasonable tinre to determine the claim of mental illness
of the defendant. Mental illness, for this purpose, is determined by the definition
stated in section 64-7-28.ThB~ court may order the defendant to be evaluated at
the Utah state hospital or any other suitable facility, and may receive the evidence
of any private or public expert witness whose evidence is offered by the defendant
or the prosecutor. A defendant who tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally "ill" shall
be examined first by the trial judge in compliance wjth the standards for taking
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be. advised that a plea of guilty and mentally
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. If the defendant is thereafter >found
not to be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully made remains a valid plea
of guilty and the defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender; If the court
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill, applying the standards set
forth in this section, the defendant's plea shall be accepted and he shall be sentenced as a mentally ill offender.
j (2) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity,"
the court shall instruct the jury that they may find the defendant guilty, not guilty,
not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser offense,
or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness but not such illness as would
warrant full exoneration. Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the offense
charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall hold a hearing as provided in this
section, and if the court finds that the defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall
sentence the defendant as a mentally ill offender.
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose any
sentence which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense. Before sentencing, the court shall conduct a hearing
to determine the defendant's present mental state.
(4) The court shall in its sentence order hospitalization at the Utah state hospital or other suitable facility if, upon completion of the hearing and consideration
of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The defendant has a mental illness as defined by section 64-7-28(1);
(b) Because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical
danger to others or self, which may include jeopardizing his own or others safety,
health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or lacks the abilityjto provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing and shelter, if
placid on probation;
(c) The defendant lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence
of inability to weigh tHefpossible costs and benefits of treatment;
(d) There is no appropriate treatment •«•,• L
tive t o , iiourt order of K ~ ^ t a l ization; and ..!•-.. _ '%• . j , ^
•xf
'^o
"*,.:. ..;,.,,»•• " - • « / "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

2 B DESSRET NEWS. WEb. P.M./rHURS. A.M., CIS. 23-24.1987;

Tillman case troubled Utah's justices
Split decision sustaining death penalty signals long appellate process
By Brett DelPorto
Oeserel News staff writer

A prosecutor says the Utah Supreme Court's 32 decision upholding the death penalty and conviction of ax-murderer Elroy Tulman may foreshadow future difficulties as the case snakes its
way through the Jong appellate process.
'There were some tough issues'* in the Tillman
case, Assistant Utah Attorney
General David B.
Thompson said Wednesday. TTm confident that
the decision is sustainable throughout the appeals
process, but that doesn't mean there's not going to
be some pretty good fights."
ChM|Justice Gordon R. Hall, writing for the
majorityf wrote that alleged errors during Tillman's trial did not warrant a new trial..
"Defendant's conviction and sentence are In all
respects affirmed,'1 Hall wrote in the 72-page
ruling.
The difficulty of the case is evident from the
fact that the justices wrote five different opinions.
Justices Richard C. Howe and I#D^e^5i|wart
concurred in the outcome and so joined In the
majority opinion, but they also wrote separate
opinions outlining their disagreements.
And Justices Christine R. Durham and Michael

D. Zimmerman disagreed outright .and wrote in
dissenting opinions that Tillman's Sentence shoufd
have been reduced to second-degree murder.;
Durham said the absence of a unanimousirer>
diet on the aggravating circumstance of the crime
and prosecutorial misconduct means that both the
inurder conviction and the death sentence should
be vacated. .,"
"Defendant is entitled to a reductipn of his conviction to second-degree murder,11 Durham wrote.
The prosecutorial misconduct charge concerns
defense claims that Deputy Salt Lake County .Attorney Michael Christensen acted improperly in
Sesting Tillman's j^fttsal to t^s^y on his ouTi
?
implied he was guilty.
.
*
But Hall said reviewing the remarks in context
indicates they need not be construed as a comment
on Tiiiman's silence.
Tillman, M, was convicted of the May 26,1982,
murder of Mark Allen Schoenfeld, who was struck
with an ax and set afire while sleeping at his home.
According to trial testimony, Schoenfeld was daU
Lng Tillman's ex-girlfriend.
Tillman's January 1983 conviction had been on
appeal before the court for two years — longer
than any other deatb-penalty case.
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•;., ^Thompson said the length of time spent
case and the long, disjointed opinion indie
issues raised on appeal were troubling to t
tices. He said there were two main issue
concerning the Utah death-penalty statute a
other concerning the jury's verdict
The questions about the death penalty o
',• whether first-degree murder is appropriate
I a person commits other offenses in order \
f ther a murder. In Tillman's case, burglaf
: arsbn — the two aggravating circumstance
• porting the first-degree murder convictj
were committed to further the murder
; than the other way around.
"He clearly committed the burglary and
in order to kill this guy," Thompson said.'
other courts have said it's notfirst-degreen
when you commit the underlying felony in
to further the murder, as opposed to the
way around."
Another major issue was the %mFpm*mm$
the aggravalin^cawmsfemces necessary fi
first-degree murder convicUon. Because t
m^di^r?etsm^fv whether the arson or tlf
oreUcally passible that someronki have tim
fi^*s^^b^n!derlym^!ohywassf^lied.

